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RECENT CASES
Criminal Law-Confessions- Government Can
Satisfy Its Burden of Proving Waiver of Miranda
Rights By Showing Warnings Given, Signed
Waiver, and Proof of Defendant's Capacity to
Understand the Warnings
Appellant, convicted of armed robbery in federal district court,
sought post-conviction relief on the ground that the trial judge erred
in admitting into evidence an oral confession obtained during a
police interrogation that allegedly contravened procedures set forth
by the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona.' Appellant specifi-
cally alleged that he had not effectively waived his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia 2 found that the evidence raised
some doubts as to appellant's understanding of the warnings and
waiver dictated by the Miranda decision. The evidence showed that
appellant would neither allow the interrogator to transcribe his
statement nor agree to sign any statement prepared by the police
despite having signed a police waiver form after receiving several
express warnings.' The court of appeals remanded the case to the
district court for further evidentiary findings. At the remand hear-
ing, the prosecution produced expert testimony that appellant had
the ability to comprehend the Miranda warnings as given in this
instance,4 but appellant contended that, without more, the govern-
ment had failed to carry its heavy burden of proving waiver.5 The
court, in the absence of any direct rebuttal evidence by appellant,
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Appellant also contended that his confession was inadmissible
under Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), because it was obtained during a period
of unnecessary delay prior to his presentment before a judicial officer.
2. Frazier v. United States, 419 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
3. The relevant parts of the trial record can be found in United States v. Frazier, 476
F.2d 891, 894 n.4 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc).
4. Dr. Stammeyer, a clinical psychologist on the staff of St. Elizabeths Hospital, testi-
fied that appellant's native abilities were at least low average or possibly even higher. He
further stated that in his opinion appellant unquestionably "could understand and appreciate
and comprehend" the meaning of the warnings. Slip opinion at 9.
5. In Miranda the Court stated that if an interrogation continues without the presence
of an attorney and a statement is taken, the government has a heavy burden of demonstrating
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination
and his right to have counsel present. 384 U.S. at 475.
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held that appellant had made a valid waiver of his rights. On ap-
peal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia' reversed, finding that the government had not satisfied its bur-
den of proving a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. On
rehearing en banc of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, held, conviction affirmed. The government
satisfies its burden of showing a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
waiver of the suspect's rights when it offers proof that the requisite
Miranda warnings have been given and the purported waiver ob-
tained and shows that the suspect is capable of understanding the
warnings. United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en
banc).
Prior to the 1966 landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona,7 a
multitude of exclusionary rules governed the admissibility in court
of statements made during an in-custody interrogation of a suspect.
The fundamental standard for judging admissibility was "voluntar-
iness," which was determined by examining the "totality of the
circumstances" surrounding each confession.' In a series of cases
beginning with the 1936 decision in Brown v. Mississippi,, the Su-
preme Court held that the fourteenth amendment due process "to-
tality of circumstances" test barred confessions obtained by physi-
cal coercion,'0 threats," trickery,'2 unduly prolonged interrogation,'
3
and denial of the right to consult counsel.' 4 Furthermore, confes-
sions were barred if the defendant possessed certain personal char-
acteristics such as feeblemindedness'5 or was insane.'" This case-by-
case determination of voluntariness forced the courts to make highly
subjective judgments on the basis of uncertain and disputed facts.
Supplementary exclusionary rules set forth in Massiah v. United
6. The opinion of Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversing the district
court is unreported; it appears in the Appendix of the instant decision. 476 F.2d at 902.
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-15 (1963).
9. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
10. Id. (accused beaten with a leather strap).
11. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) (threatened loss of state financial aid for
dependent children); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (threats of mob violence).
12. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (radio transmitter placed in car).
13. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963) (16 hours); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49 (1949) (held in solitary for 6 days); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (36 hours).
14. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
15. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
16. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960). See also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S.
293 (1963) (confession made while under the influence of a "truth serum").
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States 7 and Escobedo v. Illinois' and the McNabb-Mallory'" rule
against unnecessary delay prior to arraignment proved insufficient
to clarify the voluntariness standard. The controversy in this area
seemingly culminated in 1966 with the Miranda decision when the
Court attempted to create additional protections for the accused by
requiring an absolute procedural prerequisite for the admission of
statements obtained in a custodial interrogation. Moreover, for the
first time the Court firmly established that the fifth amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination20 and not the four-
teenth amendment due process clause was the basis for judging the
admissibility of these statements.2 1 The procedural prerequisite-a
four-fold warning-required by Miranda2 2 was designed to assure
that the individual's right to remain silent continued unfettered
throughout the interrogation process.2 3 The objective of Miranda,
however, was not to preclude the admissibility of all confessions2
4
since the Court made it clear that the defendant could, after the
proper warnings, waive his rights and proceed to make a statement2
17. 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (incriminating statements taken by federal officers from in-
dicted person in the absence of previously retained counsel were inadmissible as being viola-
tive of the sixth amendment right to counsel).
18. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (accused's right to counsel attached at the interrogation stage
and was not limited to the trial, preliminary hearing, or arraignment).
19. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.
449 (1957). This rule can also be found in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 5(a).
20. "No person .. .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. This part of the fifth amendment was first applied to the
states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). "The Fourteenth Amendment secures against
state invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal in-
fringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered
exercise of his own will. . . ." Id. at 8.
21. 384 U.S. at 460-61. Until Miranda, the courts had been in confusion regarding the
proper constitutional basis for review of allegedly coerced confessions. Although the Supreme
Court in the 1897 decision of Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897), had stated in dictum
that the admissibility of confessions was to be tested against the fifth amendment, this
interpretation was not followed due to historic barriers. The rule granting a privilege against
testimonial self-incrimination had a history, scope, and development separate from the rule
excluding coerced confessions and at common law did not apply to police interrogations. See
8 J. WIGMoRE, EviDENCE §§ 2252, 2266 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
22. A suspect must be warned in "clear and unequivocal terms" that he "has the right
to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will
be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." 384 U.S. at 467-68.
23. Id. at 444.
24. The Court declared that any statement given freely and voluntarily without any
compelling influences is admissible in evidence. Id. at 478.
25. Id. at 444. Waiver has been defined as "an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
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if the waiver is made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently."26
The government bears the heavy burden of proving such a waiver if
the suspect has no attorney present during the interrogation in
which a statement is taken.27 The Court also indicated that its re-
quirement of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver imposed
a more rigorous standard for admissibility than the former due pro-
cess voluntariness test.28 Despite Miranda's attempted clarification,
lower court standards for a Miranda waiver often appear to be indis-
tinguishable from the previous inconsistent and confusing standard
once it has been shown that the required warnings have been given.
2
1
Miranda's application is further clouded by the Seventh Circuit's
decision in United States v. Nielsen.3 In Nielsen, the defendant,
after being warned of his right to remain silent and to have an
attorney present at the questioning, said he would not sign any-
thing, including a waiver of rights form, until he talked to his attor-
ney. He then stated, however, that he would wait until later to call
the attorney and that questioning could continue. The court held his
responses to later questions inadmissible, concluding that defen-
dant's actions necessarily should have alerted the interrogator that
he was assuming seemingly contradictory positions and had not
exercised a valid waiver. Thus, instead of accepting defendant's
invitation to continue the questioning, the police should have in-
quired further to determine whether his apparent change of position
was the product of intelligence and understanding or of ignorance
26. 384 U.S. at 444.
27. Id. at 475.
28. The Court stated that in these cases it might not find the defendant's statements
to have been involuntary in traditional terms. Id. at 457.
29. In United States v. McNeil, 433 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the court found defen-
dant had voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights despite the fact that he had refused to
sign a form acknowledging that he understood the warning. See also United States v. Devall,
462 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972). Other courts, however, have considered such a refusal as a
circumstance indicating that a purported oral waiver was not validly obtained. People v.
Thiel, 26 App. Div. 2d 897, 274 N.Y.S.2d 417 (1966). The lower courts likewise are divided
as to whether an affirmative statement of waiver is an absolute prerequisite to admissibility.
See, e.g., Sullins v. United States, 389 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1968) (affirmative statement
necessary); United States v. Haynes, 385 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1006
(1968) (affirmative statement is not an essential link). The Miranda Court indicated that it
sought to avoid the case-by-case examination that was characteristic of the due process
voluntariness hearings, but the ad hoc approach still enjoys continued vitality under the
Miranda waiver rules. See, e.g., Narro v. United States, 370 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 387 U.S. 946 (1967). "[Ihe cases in which it is clear that the warnings have been
given must be considered on their own facts in order to determine the question of waiver. The
courts must do this on an ad hoc basis, since no per se rule has thus far been adopted dealing
with this problem." Id. at 329-30.
30. 392 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1968).
1072 [Vol. 26
RECENT CASES
and confusion. In the absence of such inquiry, the court concluded
it could not find that the statements were made after a knowing and
intelligent waiver." In United States v. Springer" the same court
limited Nielsen by rejecting defendant's argument that the interro-
gator's failure to conduct a "real inquiry" into the waiver precluded
the government from satisfying its heavy burden.3 The court re-
fused to extend the further inquiry required by Nielsen to any "non-
self-explanatory waiver" and restricted it to situations in which the
defendant's words or actions indicate misunderstanding.34 Thus, at
least in the Seventh Circuit, the government appears to have the
burden of inquiring into the defendant's understanding of the warn-
ings and waiver only if sufficient confusion on defendant's part is
manifested to the interrogator. It is clear that Miranda has not
solved all the problems in the area of the admissibility of confes-
sions. While it is relatively easy to determine whether the requisite
warnings have been given, the requirement that a waiver be volun-
tary, knowing, and intelligent has caused substantial conflict and
confusion in the lower courts.
After initially determining that appellant's confession had oc-
curred after his instruction to the interrogator not to transcribe his
statements, 35 the court examined the transcripts from the previous
hearings in this case to help establish what was needed for the
government to satisfy its burden of proving waiver. The court ac-
knowledged a prior D.C. Circuit panel's reasoning that appellant's
ban on note taking was evidence against intelligent waiver, but that
such an inference could be overcome by additional evidence of an
understanding waiver. In the absence of such evidence, however, the
panel had stated that the confession could not stand .3 The instant
31. Id. at 853.
32. 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972).
33. The court concluded that the proof of the giving of the warning, the showing of a
signed waiver, and the showing of defendant's stated understanding of the warning combined
to raise a presumption of validity and to shift the burden of going forward with the evidence
to the accused. Defendant Springer failed to produce evidence that tended to show the waiver
was not voluntary or knowledgeable. Id. at 1349. Presumably, the burden placed on the
defendant could be satisfied by showing evidence that he misunderstood his rights and that
this should have been apparent to the interrogator.
34. Id.
35. 476 F.2d at 894.
36. 476 F.2d at 896. The panel indicated that the inference created by appellant's
ban on note-taking might be overcome, for example, if Sergeant Keahon admonished him
that even an oral confession would be used against him and appellant replied that he knew
that but still did not want anything written down. The panel asserted, however, that addi-
tional evidence comparable in quality had not been produced. 419 F.2d at 1169.
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court found that appellant had refused to testify at the remand
hearing and had offered no direct evidence in explanation of his
request that his statement not be written down. The court then
examined the testimony of the government's expert witness that in
his opinion appellant unquestionably "could understand and appre-
ciate and comprehend" the meaning of the warnings.7 The court
characterized the expert testimony as a "highly significant and ob-
viously relevant" piece of additional evidence-the type required by
the circuit court in the decision ordering remand.18 Because appel-
lant had the capacity to comprehend the warnings, signified his
understanding of them, expressed a desire to speak without an at-
torney present, and confessed to several serious crimes 9 before ob-
jecting to the note-taking by the police officer, the court concluded"
that the government had indeed satisfied its heavy burden of prov-
ing appellant's waiver.4
The instant case's interpretation of Miranda" and its implicit
rejection of Nielsen43 call into question Miranda's effectiveness in
advancing the Supreme Court's apparent intent to create a more
stringent standard for the admissibility of confessions through the
establishment of standardized post-arrest procedures. Miranda re-
quired a knowing waiver, and certainly a minimum requirement for
such a waiver would seem to be an awareness on the part of the
suspect that his oral statements are as admissible in court as his
written ones. The evidence in the instant case, however, raises an
inference that appellant thought that oral statements were inadmis-
sible. It is possible of course that there might have been explana-
tions for appellant's ban on note-taking other than misunder-
37. 476 F.2d at 897.
38. 476 F.2d at 898.
39. In addition to several other robberies, he had already confessed to the armed rob-
bery of a store in which he had shot an employee.
40. 476 F.2d at 899.
41. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Bazelon noted that the problem posed by this case
would not arise if the Miranda warnings were so clear that anyone with minimal intelligence
could understand them. He cited surveys, however, to the effect that many, if not most,
defendants do not fully comprehend the meaning of the warnings and the effect of waiver.
476 F.2d at 900 n.3. See note 48 infra. In light of this evidence, he concluded that in the
usual case a written waiver obtained without coercion after a full and accurate warning to a
suspect of his rights is sufficient to meet the government's burden regardless of a defendant's
claim of misunderstanding, but when the suspect says or does something sufficient to put a
reasonable man on notice as to a possible misunderstanding, the interrogation must stop until
the matter is clarified or all later statements will be inadmissible.
42. See notes 28 & 29 supra and accompanying text.
43. See note 30 supra. The Seventh Circuit position is also endorsed by Judge Bazelon
in his dissent to the instant case. See note 41 supra.
1074 [Vol. 26
1973] RECENT CASES 1075
standing of the warnings given to him. Merely pointing to another
possible explanation for appellant's action," however, should not
satisfy the heavy burden placed by Miranda on the government to
prove a knowing waiver of the right to remain silent. Here the gov-
ernment does not rely on other possible explanations but instead
contends its burden has been satisfied by the introduction of expert
testimony that appellant unquestionably "could understand and
appreciate and comprehend" the meaning of the warning read to
him. 5 Mere capacity to understand," however, does not seem suffi-
cient to show that a waiver was knowing and intelligent." Further-
more, capacity to understand does not preclude a misunderstand-
ing. A recent study 8 illustrates that a significant number of even
highly intelligent suspects have failed to comprehend fully the
Miranda warnings and indicates that perhaps something more than
a mere recital of the court's warnings may be necessary to ensure
the suspect's capability to make an informed choice to speak or
remain silent. Because of the possibility that a recitation of the
warning may be an inadequate basis upon which to make this
choice, several cases have examined additional requirements for the
interrogation procedure. In Nielsen,4" for example, the Seventh Cir-
44. 476 F.2d at 894.
45. 476 F.2d at 895.
46. Despite the Miranda Court's desire to avoid an ad hoc approach to waiver cases,
the lower courts have continued to weigh the particular intelligence, education, age, and
experience of the accused. The Miranda waiver rules, however, provide little guidance for
determining the emphasis that now should be given to these variables.
47. The requirement that a waiver be intelligent appears to be a paradox. Since it is
the unanimous opinion of criminal lawyers that a client should not waive any of his rights
before having an opportunity to evaluate dispassionately the entire situation, it follows that
anyone who does waive such rights is acting unintelligently. People v. Lux, 46 Misc. 2d 561,
563, 289 N.Y.S.2d 66, 69 (Suffolk County Ct. 1967), rev'd, 34 App. Div. 2d 662, 310 N.Y.S.2d
416 (1970), afl'd, 29 N.Y.2d 848, 277 N.E.2d 923, 328 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1971). The New York court,
however, focused its attention on the individual waiving the right, not on the waiver itself,
and concluded that the intelligence that is required is that exercised by a reasonable man.
Id. at 564, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 70. See also Note, Waiver of Rights in Police Interrogations:
Miranda in the Lower Courts, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 413, 433-34 (1969).
48. Griffiths & Ayres, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft
Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967). "Even though the suspects understood that they could
refuse to answer whenever they chose, they had only the vaguest intuition about how to decide
whether to answer a given question. Their decision whether to waive their right to remain
silent was made on hunch alone, without any of the knowledge or understanding required to
make it 'knowing and intelligent.' Id. at 311. In another survey, the results showed that 15%
of the suspects failed to understand the right to remain silent; 18% failed to understand the
right to presence of counsel; and 24% failed to understand about appointed counsel. Medalie,
Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to
Implement Miranda, 66 MicH. L. REv. 1347, 1374 (1968).
49. 392 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1968). See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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cuit required the interrogator to make further inquiries of the sus-
pect when the suspect assumed seemingly contradictory positions as
to his desire to give a statement. In Springer," the same court found
that if sufficient evidence of confusion or misunderstanding is not
made apparent to the interrogator, he is not required to go beyond
the four-fold Miranda warnings.5' Although this procedure would
not protect every suspect who failed to comprehend the warnings,
2
it is submitted that it is all that could reasonably be required of the
police department. The interrogator should not be put into the posi-
tion of having to read the suspect's mind, but if the suspect's words
or acts indicate a lack of understanding, then it should not tax the
interrogator to halt the interrogation until the confusion is cleared
up. Nonetheless, the instant court implicitly rejects the Nielsen-
Springer rationale53 since appellant's action arguably should have
put the interrogator on notice as to some misunderstanding. Rejec-
tion of the Nielsen-Springer rationale clearly conflicts with
Miranda's policy of trying to place the accused on a more equal
footing with the police at the interrogation stage and gives the ac-
cused minimal protection against a misunderstanding of the warn-
ings. While requiring further inquiries into the suspect's compre-
hension of the warning is not the only possible way to create a
greater assurance that a waiver is given voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently, it is perhaps the most workable solution that has been
50. 460 F.2d 1344 (7th Cir. 1972). See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
51. "While the Miranda-dictated forms may be so mechanistically or slightingly used
as to destroy their efficacy for their intended purpose, we are not of the opinion that a law
enforcement agent has to engage in a violent argument with an in-custody subject to a point
beyond that reasonably necessary to assure effective communication." 460 F.2d at 1348.
52. If a suspect did not manifest outward signs of confusion or misunderstanding, this
procedure would be of no benefit to him. Moreover, all statements taken before the manifesta-
tion of such confusion likewise would be admissible against the suspect. This also would mean
an ad hoc approach and require litigating virtually every dispute, but this would not be any
different than the situation as it now stands.
53. Another case that apparently rejects the Nielsen-Springer rationale is State v.
McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 243 A.2d 240 (1968). In that case the New Jersey Supreme Court stated
that when the Miranda warnings are given, a waiver is made no less knowing and intelligent
because a suspect thought that what he said could not be used against him in court since it
was only oral. 52 N.J. at 55, 243 A.2d at 251. The court further expressed that the state should
take advantage of a suspect's ignorance and misunderstanding at every opportunity in the
detection process. 52 N.J. at 53, 243 A.2d at 250-51. In addition to conflicting with the policy
of Miranda, the language also goes far beyond what was required to decide the factual
situation involved. It is submitted that the same result-admission of the confession-most
likely would have been reached by a court that followed the Nielsen-Springer rationale since
the defendant in McKnight did not show sufficient indications of misunderstanding to the
interrogator to require a halt to the interrogation and further explanations.
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advanced. Some commentators 54 have suggested that the arresting
or interrogating officer explain both the warnings and the nature
and meaning of waiver in his own words instead of merely reciting
the warnings in the language of Miranda. This would defeat, how-
ever, one of the primary purposes of Miranda-to introduce more
standardized procedures into the post-arrest period and to eliminate
the high degree of informality and variability that characterized
pre-Miranda arrests and interrogations. Individual legal interpreta-
tions of the Miranda warnings by each interrogator would necessar-
ily be a return to irregularity. Another possible solution might be
to require all extrajudicial confessions or statements to be made in
the presence of counsel after the accused has received counsel's
advice. This solution is the most effective way to ensure that the
suspect knows and fully understands his rights,5 but the exorbitant
cost and the myriad administrative details endemic to a system of
stationhouse attorneys should render it impractical and unpopular.
Other commentators" insist that all extrajudicial statements made
by a defendant should be inadmissible regardless of warnings and
waivers. The theory behind this sentiment is that an accusatory
system is designed to function without the cooperation of the party
accused. Moreover, according to this theory, the defendant is always
free to plead guilty, a plea likely to have been entered in sober
judgment upon counsel's advice with full consideration of its advan-
tages and disadvantages. Our system, however, relies heavily on
custodial statements by the accused as the frequency with which the
waiver question has arisen since Miranda indicates, and it is doubt-
ful that a radical change is likely in the near future. The decision
in Miranda was prompted in part by conflicting lower court stan-
dards that had emerged under the due process rules and under the
supplementary exclusionary rules, but ironically the ambiguity and
incompleteness of Miranda itself has caused an uneven implemen-
tation of the Supreme Court's apparent goals. The instant decision,
by allowing the government to prove a valid waiver by expert testi-
mony of mere capacity to understand warnings, exhibits the failure
of the courts to follow the policy behind Miranda when interpreting
the waiver standards that Miranda's imprecise terminology created.
Precise waiver guidelines must be established before the Miranda
54. See Note, Waiver of Rights in Police Interrogations: Miranda in the Lower Courts,
36 U. CH!. L. REv. 413, 429 (1969).
55. Griffith & Ayres, supra note 48, at 318.
56. See 20 STAN. L. REv. 1269, 1280 (1968).
1973] 1077
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approach to the confessions problem can assure more stringent stan-
dards for the admissibility of confessions-the apparent intent of
the Miranda Court.
Criminal Procedure-Grand Jury-Attorney
Work Product Consisting of Written Summaries
and Personal Recollections of Interviews Is Privi-
leged Against Disclosure at Federal Grand Jury
Investigations
Appellant, house counsel for Northern Natural Gas Company,
was subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury1 to answer
questions about information acquired by him in connection with his
investigation of alleged bribery payments made by Northern Natu-
ral employees to public officials. The United States Attorney also
issued a subpoena duces tecum2 directing Northern Natural to pro-
duce all memoranda, notes, or records compiled by appellant during
his interviews with informants.' Appellant, who refused to tender
the subpoenaed documents or to divulge any matter communicated
to him by the interviewees, 4 contended at a district court hearing
to compel disclosure that the work product doctrine precluded reve-
l. The grand jury was convened for investigating purposes rather than for the purpose
of determining probable cause for charges previously made. For the distinction between the
functions of an indicting grand jury and an investigatory grand jury see Boudin, The Federal
Grand Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (1972). Although the common law did not clearly authorize the
grand jury to initiate an investigation on its own motion, see Note, 37 MiNN. L. Rav. 586,
592 (1953), the majority of state and federal courts sanction the initiation of an investigation
even though there is merely a suspicion that a crime has been committed and without any
particular suspect in mind. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); United States v. Cohn,
452 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 975 (1971); United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp.
283, 294-98 (N.D. Cal. 1952) (grand jurors may initiate an investigation on the basis of
rumors, hearsay, reports, and even suspicion).
2. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c). A grand jury subpoena duces tecum can be issued against
either an individual or a corporate entity before any specific charges have been preferred
against them by the Government. In re Eastman Kodak Co., 7 F.R.D. 760 (W.D.N.Y. 1947).
3. The subpoena duces tecum required the production of, inter alia, "[miemoranda
reflecting interview with informants, reports, correspondence sent and received, affidavits
and statements of informants, other documents prepared and compiled in connection with
an investigation conducted by Frank Duffy and other personnel of company with respect to
payments of money channeled through Rochester, Goodell, Moldovan & Spain Engineers,
Inc. in connection with the construction and acquisition of premises and rights of way for the
construction of the so-called 'Eight Inch Chicago Pipeline.'" Duffy v. Dier, 465 F.2d 416, 417
(8th Cir. 1972).
4. Appellant also refused to divulge the informants' names. See note 8 infra.
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lation of the information sought. The Government replied that, even
if the work product rule were applicable to grand jury investiga-
tions,- the governmental interest to be served by securing the infor-
mation in the possession of appellant was sufficient to invoke the
"good cause"' exception to the rule. Although the district court
noted the probable applicability of the work product doctrine to
grand jury proceedings, 7 it held that the Government had estab-
lished an overriding interest in obtaining the information and
therefore ordered disclosure.' Responding to the court order, appel-
lant agreed to furnish the grand jury the names of all persons con-
tacted by him, but otherwise refused to comply. The district court
consequently found appellant guilty of civil contempt.9 On appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, held,
reversed. An attorney's work product, which consists of written
summaries and personal recollections of interviews with informants,
is protected absolutely from disclosure at federal grand jury investi-
gatory proceedings. Duffy v. United States, 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir.
1973).
The English common-law courts afforded early recognition to
a "legal professional privilege" against discovery of communications
5. The Government raised 2 additional arguments against applying the work product
doctrine to grand jury investigations: first, it pointed to Schwimmer v. United States, 232
F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956), which stated by way of dicta that the
Hickman rule is inapplicable to grand jury investigations. See note 27 infra and accompany-
ing text. Secondly, it relied upon the omission of the doctrine from those sections in the
proposed Federal Rules of Evidence dealing with the privileges available to grand jury wit-
nesses. 41 U.S.L.W. 4021 (Nov. 21, 1972). See note 35 infra.
6. See note 21 infra and accompanying text.
7. Duffy v. United States, 473 F.2d 840, 841 n.2 (8th Cir. 1973).
8. Appellant had argued in the alternative that the subpoenaed information was pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege. Because the availability of that privilege depended
upon whether the informants were appellant's clients, the district court ordered appellant to
disclose the identity of all informants and all matters not otherwise protected by the asserted
privilege. Duffy v. Dier, 465 F.2d 416, 417 (8th Cir. 1972). See note 12 infra and accompanying
text. Appellant thereupon petitioned for a writ of mandamus against the district court judge
to vacate his order. In denying the writ the Eighth Circuit held that appellant must comply
with the district court's order to disclose the identity of all informants in order to determine
finally the issue of the asserted attorney-client privilege. Id. at 418 n.2.
9. Appellant was adjudged a "recalcitrant witness" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826
(1970), which provides in part: "Whenever a witness in any proceeding before. . . any. ..
grand jury of the United States refuses without just cause shown to comply with an order of
the court to testify or provide other information, including any book, paper, document,
record, recording or other material, the court. . . may summarily order his confinement at
a suitable place until such time as the witness is willing to give such testimony or provide
such information. .. ."
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between an attorney and his client or third parties.'" The privilege
extended to all documents prepared by or for counsel with a view
to litigation." Although American courts uniformly have accepted
the notion of privileged communication between a lawyer and his
client, 2 they have offered substantially less protection to statements
and documents obtained by attorneys from third parties.' 3 Follow-
ing the adoption of the liberal discovery provisions contained in the
10. R. CRoss, EVIDENCE 240-44 (3d ed. 1967); 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.63, at
346 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MOORE]. The original justification for the privilege
was that an attorney's express or implied pledge of secrecy would be violated if he were
required to divulge confidential information given to him by his client. In other words, the
courts sought to preserve the "oath and honor" of the attorney. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2290, at 543 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). See Generally Radin, The Privilege of Confi-
dential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487 (1928). English
courts later reasoned that the protection afforded the attorney-client communication creates
a more confidential atmosphere in which the client will disclose more freely and completely
the circumstances of his case that are necessary for the attorney to provide accurate advice.
See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 87 (2d ed. 1972); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra at § 2290.
11. See 4 MooRE, supra note 10, 26.63, at 346 n.2. For a discussion and collection of
cases see Gardner, A Re-evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 VILL. L. REV. 279, 297
n.60, 300 (1963).
12. See 4 MooRE, supra note 10, 26.60[z], at 229. American courts have denominated
the protection given to confidential communications between a lawyer and client in the course
of their professional relationship the "attorney-client privilege." Mitchell v. Bass, 252 F.2d
513 (8th Cir. 1958); Appeal of Turner, 72 Conn. 305, 44 A. 310 (1899); 8 WIGMORE, supra note
10, at § 2290. The privilege generally is regarded as being personal to the client. MCCORMICK,
supra note 10, at § 92; see Magida v. Continental Can Co., 12 F.R.D. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1951);
cf. Canon 4, ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIaLrr. Moreover, the courts are in general
agreement that the fact that the client is a corporation does not vitiate the privilege. Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd., 400 U.S. 348 (1971)
(corporate employee's communication to house counsel is privileged); Philadelphia v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandate denied sub nom., General Elec.
Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). Contra,
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill.), adhered to, 209
F. Supp. 321 (1962), rev'd. on other grounds, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
929 (1963) (noting fact that client is a corporation does not affect the claim of an attorney to
his work product privilege). See generally Maurer, Privileged Communications and the Cor-
porate Counsel, 28 ALA. LAw. 352, 368 (1967); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for Corporate
Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARv. L. REV. 424 (1970). See also MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE rule 209(a) (1942); UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 26(3)(A).
13. Gardner, supra note 11, at 300; see, e.g., King v. Ashley, 179 N.Y. 281, 72 N.E. 106
(1904) (information acquired by counsel from persons and sources other than his client is not
privileged). Contra, In re Aspinwall, 2 F. Cas. 64 (No. 591) (S.D.N.Y. 1874). Some states,
however, recognize a broad privilege similar to the English view. See, e.g., Robertson v.
Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943) (statement obtained by employer from
employee to be used by employer's attorney in connection with threatened litigation is a
privileged communication between the attorney and employer-client); Schmitt v. Emery, 211
Minn. 547, 2 N.W.2d 413 (1942) (statement obtained from employee by employer's attorney
in anticipation of litigation is a privileged communication between attorney and employer-
client).
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," the district courts articulated
differing limitations on the permissible scope of inquiry into materi-
als gathered by an adverse party in anticipation of trial. 15 The Su-
preme Court resolved much of the uncertainty in the 1947 case of
Hickman v. Taylor" when it established a general rule of nondiscov-
erability of an attorney's pretrial preparations, or "work product."' 7
In Hickman, respondent had been retained to represent the owners
of a tugboat in litigation that might arise over a fatal accident.
Petitioner, administrator of the estate of a deceased crew member,
subsequently brought an action against the tugboat owners and
sought to discover the contents of all written and oral statements
taken by respondent during his interviews with surviving crewmen.
The Third Circuit, reversing a district court judgment for peti-
tioner,8 held that the statements were privileged" and therefore not
14. The primary discovery devices provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
contained in Rule 26 (depositions pending action), Rule 27 (depositions before action), Rule
33 (interrogatories to parties), Rule 34 (discovery and inspection of documents), Rule 35
(physical and mental examination of persons), and Rule 36 (admission of facts and genuine-
ness of documents). Former Rule 26(b) provided in part: "[he deponent may be examined
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action .. . including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of
persons having knowledge of relevant facts."
15. Compare McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) (discovery disal-
lowed because it would penalize the diligent and place a premium on laziness), with Hoffman
v. Palmer, 129 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd on other grounds, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) (need for
ascertainment of the facts of the case outweighs potential unfairness to the diligent attorney).
The courts have consistently held, however, that the information must have been obtained
in anticipation of litigation to qualify for any protection. See, e.g., Arney v. Hormal & Co.,
53 F.R.D. 179, 181 (D. Minn. 1971); Rediker v. Warfield, 11 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
16. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
17. The Hickman case and the implications of work product protection have received
extensive commentary. See, e.g., Cooper, Work Product of the Rulesmakers, 53 MINN. L. REv.
1269 (1969); Fortenbaugh, Hickman versus Taylor Revisited, 13 DEFENS E L.J. 1 (1964); Tol-
man, Discovery Under the Federal Rules: Production of Documents and the Work Product
of the Lawyer, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 498 (1958); Note, Discovery and the Hickman Case: A
Decade Later, 37 N.D.L. REv. 67 (1961); Annot., 35 A.L.R.3d 412 (1971).
18. The district court held that statements of a third party obtained by a lawyer do not
come within the attorney-client privilege and are therefore discoverable. 4 F.R.D. 479, 482
(E.D. Pa. 1945).
19. 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945). The Third Circuit admitted that the traditional rule of
attorney-client privilege as applied in the United States would not encompass the statements.
See note 12 supra and accompanying text. However, it found the statements "privileged"
within the meaning of Rule 26 (b). See note 14 supra. The court reasoned that the word
"privileged" as used in the federal rules was not equivalent to an evidentiary privilege.
Although the Supreme Court in Hickman impliedly found contrary to the Third Circuit on
this point, the Court explicitly held later that "privileged" as used in the discovery rules is
to be given the same meaning that it has in the law of evidence. United States v. Reynolds,
345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953).
1973] 1081
1082 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
discoverable. The Supreme Court rejected the Third Circuit's privi-
lege analysis, but affirmed on the ground that the discovery rules
were not intended to provide unrestricted access to opposing
attorneys' files and thought processes.2 1 Speaking for a unanimous
Court, Mr. Justice Murphy delineated two categories of work prod-
uct: first, the signed statements and affidavits of witnesses, which
are exempt from discovery absent a showing of good cause;2' and
secondly, an attorney's personal recollections, mental impressions,
and summarizing notes of statements by witnesses, which are ex-
empt from discovery abent a demonstration of extraordinary cir-
cumstances. 22 The Hickman rule, as well as subsequent case law
clarifications, 23 were incorporated into Rule 26(b) (3) and (4) when
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended in 1970. Not-
withstanding its genesis in federal civil procedure, the work product
doctrine has been utilized by a number of state courts to support a
denial of discovery in criminal cases.24 Moreover, work product pro-
20. Proponents of work product protection argue that the rule (1) prevents a lazy attor-
ney from profiting by his opponent's diligence, (2) encourages the development of facts and
legal tactics without fear of discovery by the adverse party, (3) encourages lawyers to reduce
their preparations to writing, (4) precludes the possibility of counsel having to testify as to
prior inconsistent statements of a witness, and (5) preserves counsel as an effective advocate
and officer of the court. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.9, at 205-07 (1965); Developments
in the Law-fDiscovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 1028-29 (1961).
21. As examples of what might constitute a sufficient showing of "good cause," the
Court mentioned the unavailability of the witness making the statements, the admissibility
in evidence of the information sought, and the utility of the statements for purposes of
impeachment or corroboration. 329 U.S. at 511. A substantial number of post-Hickman cases
dealing with the issue of "good cause" often reached conflicting results. For a summary of
these decisions see 2A W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 652.4
(C. Wright rev. ed. 1961). In the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the "good cause" requirement was inserted into Rule 26(b) (3) & (4). Discovery of work
product is allowed "only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need
of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship
to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." A "good cause"
showing is made unnecessary, however, for statements previously made by the discovering
party concerning the action. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (3). It is also unnecessary for facts known
or opinions held by an expert specially employed by an adverse party for purposes of testi-
mony at trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (4) (A).
22. Referring to the oral statements of witnesses, the Court said: "[w]e do not believe
that any showing of necessity can be made under the circumstances of this case so as to justify
production." 329 U.S. at 512.
23. See 4 MOORE, supra note 10, 26.63[10], at 410.
24. See, e.g., People v. Boehm, 270 Cal. App. 2d 13, 75 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1969) (notes
made by prosecutor from interview with witness constitute prosecutor's work product and are
not discoverable); Colebrook v. State, 205 So. 2d 675 (Fla. App. 1968), vacated and remanded
on other grounds sub nom. Jones v. Florida, 394 U.S. 720 (1969) (statements of rape victim
were work product of prosecution and not discoverable after victim's testimony on direct
examination); Rose v. State, 427 S.W.2d 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (unsigned narrative
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tection has been extended to both the prosecutor and defendant in
federal criminal litigation by virtue of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. 25 Prior to 1973, only two federal courts had
addressed the question of the availability of work product protection
account of theft is work product of prosecution). But see State ex rel. Polley v. Superior Court,
81 Ariz. 127, 302 P.2d 263 (1956) (stenographic transcript taken from defendant in murder
case is not prosecution's work product). At early common law, in both England and the
United States, discovery was unavailable in criminal cases. Compare Rex v. Holland, 100
Eng. Rep. 1248, 1249 (K.B. 1792) (discovery would tend to "subvert the whole system of
criminal law"), with People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927).
See generally Norton, Discovery in the Criminal Process, 61 J. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 11, 11-13
(1970). Although many states still adhere to the common-law doctrine of nondiscoverability
in criminal cases, a growing number of jurisdictions have adopted procedural rules that
specifically provide for discovery. See Note, "Work Product" in Criminal Discovery, 1966
WASH. U.L.Q. 321, 326-34. For a discussion of the competing considerations involved in
allowing discovery in criminal proceedings see Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting
Event or Quest for Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279, and Flannery, The Prosecutor's Case
Against Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 74 (1963).
25. Rule 16, similar to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defines the
general scope of discovery in criminal cases and embodies work product limitations on discov-
erability. An order of discovery in favor of the defendant is within the trial judge's discretion
and may be conditioned upon an allowance of discovery by the prosecution. The prosecution,
however, may not discover or inspect "reports, memoranda, or other internal defense docu-
ments made by the defendant, or his attorney or agents in connection with the investigation
or defense of the case, or of statements made by the defendant. . . or defense witnesses, or
by prospective. . . defense witnesses, to the defendant, his agent or attorneys." FED. R. CUM.
P. 16(c). Subsection (b) precludes "discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other
internal government documents made by government agents in connection with the investiga-
tion or prosecution of the case, or of statements made by government witnesses or prospective
government witnesses (other than the defendant) to agents of the government except as
provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500." FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b). Unlike the qualified privilege from
discovery of work product in civil cases, Rule 16 contains no wording that suggests that the
immunity can be defeated upon a showing of "good cause." See Rezneck, The New Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 GEo. L. J. 1276, 1280-82 (1966) (argues that the creation of
such an extensive work product exemption for the Government was not only unwise, but
unnecessary in view of the protection afforded by the doctrine of governmental privilege). The
American Bar Association, however, has proposed that only prosecutorial work product be
immunized from discovery and only to the extent that it contains the opinions, theories, or
conclusions of the prosecuting attorney or members of his legal staff. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N
STANDARDS RELATING TO DIScOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 2.6 (Approved Draft 1970).
See also Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure for the United States District Courts, 48 F.R.D. 553, 587 (1970). Proposed Rule 16 would
enlarge the scope of discoverable items, make prosecutorial discovery independent of discov-
ery by the defendant, and reduce the extent of work product protection for both parties. For
a criticism of Proposed Rule 16 see Note, Prosecutorial Discovery Under Proposed Rule 16,
85 HARV. L. REv. 994 (1972).
The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970), which is incorporated by reference into FED.
R. CriM. P. 16(b), provides that the Government in a criminal proceeding need not produce
the "statement" of a witness until he has testified on direct examination, at which time
production of relevant statements is required. The word "statement" is defined in subsection
(e) of the Act to include: "(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or
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in the context of grand jury proceedings. 26 In the first of these cases,
Schwimmer v. United States,27 the Eighth Circuit summarily dis-
missed appellant's work product claim by stating simply that the
Hickman rule is relevant solely to discovery in civil litigation. In a
later federal district court decision, In re Terkeltoub,2 8 it was held,
however, that an attorney may assert the Hickman rule to protect
his work product from disclosure. In that case, a defense lawyer was
summoned before an investigating grand jury to respond to allega-
tions that he and his client had attempted to induce a third party
to testify favorably in the client's pending perjury trial. The attor-
ney refused to answer the grand jury's questions primarily on the
ground that to do so would constitute a violation of his client's fifth
amendment due process rights and sixth amendment right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel. The district court passed over the consti-
tutional issues raised by the attorney and relied upon Hickman as
authority for denying the Government's request for compulsory dis-
closure.
29
The instant court initially observed that the subpoenaed mate-
rial consisted solely of appellant's personal recollections and sum-
marizing notes made in connection with his preparation for antici-
pated litigation. Concluding therefore that the information sought
constituted appellant's work product, 3 the court addressed itself to
otherwise adopted or approved by him; (2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other
recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral
statement made by said witness . . . or (3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a
transcription thereof, if any, made by said witness to a grand jury." 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e). For
a comparison of the work product doctrine and the Jencks Act see Cleary, Hickman v. Jencks:
Jurisprudence of the Adversary System, 14 VAD. L. REv. 865 (1961). Several states have
similar statutory or procedural rules that require the prosecutor to disclose the identity of
witnesses who have testified before grand juries. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 995a (West
1970); IOWA CODE ANN. § 772.3 (1950); Ky. R. CRIM. P. 6.08; ORE. REv. STAT. § 132.580 (1971).
26. Courts traditionally have recognized certain common-law privileges against com-
pulsory disclosure at grand jury proceedings. See, e.g., Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332
(1951) (husband-wife privilege); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963) (privi-
lege against self-incrimination); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956) (attorney-client privilege). See also In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 400
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Comment, The Rights of a Witness Before a Grand Jury, 1967 DuKE L.J.
97, 121; Comment, The Grand Jury Witness' Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 62 Nw.
U.L. REv. 207 (1967). For a discussion of the statutory immunities available to a witness see
Note, The Federal Witness Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitu-
tional Tightrope, 72 YALE L.J. 1568 (1963).
27. 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
28. 256 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
29. Citing Hickman, the court left open the possibility that "still more rare circumstan-
ces could justify a demand of the kind here in question." 256 F. Supp. at 686. Compare note
22 supra.
30. The court noted that the fact that appellant's client was a corporation in no way
affected appellant's claim to work product immunity. See note 12 supra.
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the threshold question whether the work product doctrine is applic-
able to grand jury proceedings. The court explained that the
Terkeltoub case was "direct and convincing authority' 3 supporting
the application of the doctrine to the instant case and therefore
supporting a reversal of the district court's contempt ruling.32 Al-
though it recognized that language in its earlier decision in
Schwimmer had rendered doubtful the applicability of the
Hickman rule to grand jury proceedings, the court reasoned that the
summary treatment accorded the issue in Schwimmer was evidence
that it had not been fully considered. Because of the absence of
other direct authority, the instant court attempted to buttress its
conclusion by examining several decisions that excused a grand jury
witness from testifying on matters protected by a constitutional,
statutory, or common-law privilege.3 Tracing the origin of work
product immunity to the legal professional privilege of early English
law,34 the court concluded that the work product rule is an estab-
lished common-law privilege that, on the authority of the examined
cases, may be invoked in a grand jury investigatory proceeding.
35
Moreover, the court reasoned that the policy considerations under-
lying the work product doctrine in civil litigation36 are even more
forceful in the context of criminal proceedings. The court then
turned to the Government's assertion that the good cause exception
to the Hickman rule justified compelled disclosure of the informa-
tion in appellant's possession. Adverting to the second category of
work product outlined in Hickman,7 the court held that appellant's
personal recollections and summarizing notes were absolutely,
31. 473 F.2d at 843.
32. In Terkeltoub the grand jury investigation was prompted by allegations of lawyer
misconduct. The absence of such allegations in the instant situation was treated by the court
as a significant factor in favor of giving appellant work product immunity. 473 F.2d at 843.
33. One case examined by the court was Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), noted
in The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAv. L. Rav. 137, 137-48 (1972), which held that the
first amendment does not afford newsmen a privilege against compulsory disclosure to a
grand jury of information gathered from confidential sources. The court's reference to
Branzburg is puzzling since the Supreme Court's rejection of a newsman's arguably valid
constitutional claim would tend to defeat the common-law privilege asserted in the instant
case. See also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (the speech or debate clause does
not extend immunity to a Senator's aid from testifying before a federal investigating grand
jury), noted in 26 VAD. L. REv. 327 (1973).
34. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
35. The court summarily dismissed the Government's argument that the omission of
the work product doctrine from the privileges made applicable to grand jury proceedings by
the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence was intended to affect the scope of the doctrine.
36. See note 20 supra.
37. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
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rather than conditionally privileged, and therefore concluded that
the good cause exception was inapposite. Furthermore, the court
noted that, even if appellant's work product were not absolutely
privileged, the fact that the persons contacted by appellant were
known and accessible to the grand jury tended to vitiate a possible
showing of good cause by the Government. 8
The instant decision marks the first time that an unqualified
immunity from discovery of an attorney's work product has been
extended to federal grand jury investigations." As originally con-
ceived by the Hickman Court, however, the work product rule was
intended to restrict the scope of discovery available to opposing
counsel after an action had been initiated. Unlike an indicting
grand jury, the function of which is to determine the existence of
probable cause for an arrest or charges previously made, an investi-
gating grand jury inquires into the possibility that criminal offenses
may have occurred." Since a grand jury investigation precedes the
return of an indictment and docketing of the case for trial, the
discovery provisions of Rule 16 are inoperative and there is accord-
ingly no discovery attempt to which work product limitations can
attach.' Although the Terkeltoub court utilized the work product
rule to uphold an attorney's refusal to answer grand jury questions,
that case is distinguishable from the instant controversy on the
ground that the attorney in Terkeltoub was summoned after his
client had been indicted and while he was engaged in preparing for
the pending trial. Compulsory disclosure would have permitted the
prosecutor to circumvent the work product limitations of the discov-
38. The court further pointed out that if the statements involved in the instant case
had been made to the Government, they would not have been discoverable by appellant since
they did not fall within any of the categories set forth in subsection (e) of the Jencks Act.
See note 25 supra. The court reasoned that it would be inequitable to require appellant to
disclose statements that would not be discoverable by him if they were in the hands of the
prosecution.
39. The Hickman Court itself avoided establishing a rule that would have the effect
achieved by the instant decision of elevating work product protection to the status of a
privilege. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
40. See note 1 supra.
41. The instant court's awareness of this argument is evidenced by its apparent attempt
to rebut it. The court argued that "[tihe test of whether the work product doctrine applies
is not whether litigation has begun but whether documents were prepared or obtained in
anticipation of litigation." 473 F.2d at 847. The court, however, confuses two issues: the
inclusiveness of the definition of "work product" and the circumstances in which work prod-
uct protection may be asserted. Although the definition of "work product" comprehends
materials acquired at a time when litigation is still a contingency, the assertion of the doctrine
is not made until after suit is filed and discovery by an adverse litigant is attempted. See
Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82, 86 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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ery rules by use of the grand jury subpoena power.4 2 Moreover, the
Terkeltoub holding is weakened by the fact that the attorney him-
self was under investigation for possible obstruction of justice
charges and therefore could have interposed his own fifth amend-
ment objection to disclosure. There are valid policy considerations,
however, that make the result in the instant case a desirable one.
Perhaps implicit in the court's analysis was an awareness that a
grand jury investigation is a de facto discovery device in favor of the
prosecutor. 3 The United States Attorney not only.is permitted to
be present during the grand jury investigation, but often directs the
focus of its inquiry." If in addition he were able to compel disclosure
of work product, he could acquire information that otherwise would
be unobtainable by him through the regular discovery process.45 A
defense attorney faced with the possibility of having to apprise the
Government of the results of his research might elect to postpone
his investigative efforts until an indictment against his client had
been returned. By that time, however, witnesses' memories might
have faded and potential sources of information become unavaila-
ble.4" Since a defense attorney has no correlative right to discover
42. Several courts have held that the subpoena power authorized by FED. R. CRIM. P.
17(c) has only the limited function of procuring the production of papers and documents for
inspection and use in evidence at trial, and that it is wholly unavailable for use as a pre-trial
discovery device. Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 220 (1951); United States
v. Marcello, 423 F.2d 993 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 959 (1970); United States v. Iozia,
13 F.R.D. 335, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (sets forth a list of requirements for pre-trial inspection
under Rule 17(c)). See generally 2 L. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDERTHE FEDERAL RULES
§ 17:91 (1966).
43. See E. WILLAMs, ONE MAN'S FREEDOM 166 (1962) (characterizes the grand jury as
"the most superb engine for discovery ever invented by the mind"). A number of federal
courts have dealt with the propriety of using the grand jury subpoena power as an investigat-
ing tool of the Government. See, e.g., United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677,
684 (1958); In re April 1956 Term Grand Jury, 239 F.2d 263, 272 (7th Cir. 1956); Durbin v.
United States, 221 F.2d 520, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1954); United States v. Pack, 150 F. Supp. 262,
264 (D. Del. 1957); cf. United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 845, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 845,
rehearing denied, 379 U.S. 986 (1964) (held that it was improper for the Government to use
the grand jury for the sole or dominant purpose of preparing an already pending indictment
for trial); Application of Myers, 202 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (misuse of administrative
subpoena power). See also 8 MOORE, supra note 9, at 6.02[1][b]; Boudin, The Federal
Grand Jury, 61 Geo. L. J. 1 (1972); Rief, The Grand Jury Witness and Compulsory Testimony
Legislation, 10 Am. CRiM. L. REv. 829, 847-48 (1972). The misuse of grand jury inquisitorial
powers by the Government has been criticized especially in investigations of dissident groups.
See Note, Federal Grand Jury Investigations of Political Dissidents, 7 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ.
LIB. L. Rav. 432 (1972).
44. 1 L. ORFIELD, supra note 42, at § 6:74.
45. See note 25 supra.
46. "By the time [the defendant] is charged and a private investigator retained, the
scene has changed, and trails, if there were any, have been obliterated." State v. Tate, 47
N.J. 352, 354, 221 A.2d 12, 14 (1966).
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the identity of Government informants" nor access to their grand
jury tesimony prior to direct examination,48 he would have to rely
to a greater extent upon the discretionary discovery orders of the
trial judge to acquire the needed information.49 In addition to hind-
ering preparations, requiring an attorney not only to identify his
client"0 but also to divulge information that might provide a suffi-
cient basis for a subsequent indictment by the grand jury would
place him in the anomalous position of being a witness against his
own client. Moreover, the knowledge that the attorney-witness has
been retained to prepare for possible criminal charges might give
rise to an inference of client guilt consciousness that would render
the grand jurors less capable of making an objective determination
of the occurrence of a criminal violation and the complicity of the
client.51 Thus it is arguable that the client's act of retaining counsel
before charges against him have been filed is testimonial in nature
and, because retention of counsel might readily be construed by the
grand jurors as an admission of guilt, the attorney cannot be com-
pelled to testify without infringing his client's fifth amendment
47. There is a well-established governmental privilege against disclosure of the identity
of informants who have given information about supposed crimes to a prosecuting or investi-
gating officer. See Scher v. United States, 355 U.S. 251, 254 (1958) (public policy prohibits
disclosure of the identity of government informants); Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 214, 221 (1951) (although government may be required to disclose the contents of
communications received from informers, it is not required to disclose the informer's ident-
ity). Disclosure of the informant's identity is required, however, when the identity is impor-
tant to the establishment of a defense. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); United
States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639 (W.D. Ky. 1937).
48. The Jencks Act prohibits discovery of a Government witness's grand jury testimony
until after he has testified on direct examination. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855,
870-71 (1966). For a discussion of the relative pretrial advantages of the prosecution and
defense see Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 DUKE L.J.
477; Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69
YALE L.J. 1149 (1960); Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF.
L. REv. 56 (1961); Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv.
228 (1964).
49. See note 25 supra.
50. The attorney might argue successfully, however, that because disclosure of the
identity of his client would lead ultimately to disclosure of the client's motive for seeking legal
advice and because the client's motive is within the purview of communications protected
by the attorney-client privilege, see 8 WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2313, at 609-10, the client's
identity need not be revealed. See Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965) (client's
identity is within the attorney-client privilege when that identity is the essence of the confi-
dential communication). See also Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
51. Although the investigating grand jury frequently does not itself indict, but merely
presents the results of its investigation to an indicting grand jury, the danger of prejudice
would not seem to be decreased significantly. See Note, Discretionary Power in the Judiciary
to Organize a Special Investigating Grand Jury, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 954, 957 (1963).
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privilege against self-incrimination. 52 A final objection to compelled
work product disclosure is the danger that the attorney's statements
will be used against him unfairly at trial. If the defense lawyer
before the grand jury fails to recall the exact statements of his
interviewees, or if the interviewees themselves forget on cross-
examination what they had related to the interviewing lawyer while
their memories were fresh, the prosecutor could use the attorney's
grand jury testimony both to impeach the credibility of the witness
and to call into question the integrity of the attorney.53 The forego-
ing objections to compulsory work product disclosure appear equally
persuasive when applied either to an attorney's personal recollec-
tions and written summaries of conversations with informants or to
the signed statements of those informants in the possession of the
attorney. Accordingly, the instant court's implied limitation of its
holding to the former category of work product seems unnecessary.
The facts encountered in the instant case, however, are not likely
to occur frequently. In the typical situation, a lawyer will not have
been retained before a grand jury has been convened to investigate
his client's conduct. Nevertheless, when the circumstance arises, an
unqualified protection of the attorney's work product is justified.
52. The privilege against self-incrimination "protects an accused only from being com-
pelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial
or communicative nature ... " Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966) (emphasis
added). See WIGMORE, supra note 10, § 2265, at 386. It might be contended that the commu-
nication would be from the attorney rather than from the client and that therefore the client
would not be compelled to disclose incriminating information. In analogous cases, however,
the courts have held that the attorney has standing to assert on behalf of his client the client's
privilege against self-incrimination. In United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963),
for example, an attorney representing a taxpayer under investigation by the Internal Revenue
Service was held to have standing to suppress a grand jury subpoena duces tecum for can-
celled checks and a bank statement given to him by the taxpayer by invoking the taxpayer's
privilege against self-incrimination. Accord, Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal.
1956).
53. "Whenever the testimony of the witness would differ from the 'exact' statement the
lawyer had delivered, the lawyer's statement would be whipped out to impeach the witness.
Counsel producing his adversary's 'inexact' statement could lose nothing by saying, 'Here is
a contradiction, gentlemen of the jury. I do not know whether it is my adversary or his witness
who is not telling the truth, but one is not. . . .' The lawyer who delivers such statements
often would find himself branded a deceiver afraid to take the stand to support his own
version of the witness's conversation with him, or else he will have to go on the stand to defend
his own credibility-perhaps against that of his chief witness, or possibly even his client."
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 517 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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Public Employees -Freedom of Association-
Discharge of Non-policy-making Public Employ-
ees on Ground of Political Affiliation Infringes
Employees' Freedom of Association
Plaintiffs,' former employees of the State of Illinois who were
not protected by the state's civil service laws,2 brought an action for
reinstatement and backpay3 alleging that they had been discharged
from public employment for failing to maintain membership in the
political party of the newly elected state administration.' Plaintiffs
contended that defendant, Secretary of State, by conditioning con-
tinued employment on political party affiliation, abridged their first
amendment freedom of association.' Denying that the dismissals
were politically motivated,' defendant argued that because plain-
tiffs could claim no constitutional or statutory right to public em-
ployment they could be discharged at will.' The district court
1. The complaint was filed on behalf of the entire class of union members employed by
defendant, as Secretary of State. In remanding the instant case the court left the determina-
tion of the appropriate class, if any, to the district court. Affidavits of 94 employees dis-
charged by the Republicans following the election were in the record. According to one report,
4,000 employees were dismissed in the Secretary of State's office when Secretary Lewis was
appointed by Governor Ogilvie. Taking Politics Out of the Paycheck, Bus. WEEK, May 22,
1971, at 22.
2. The positions held by plaintiffs, which did not bear policy-making responsibilities,
included such jobs as building employees, clerical workers, license examiners and the like.
3. Plaintiffs additionally sought to enjoin future dismissals for partisan reasons. Federal
jurisdiction was invoked under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
4. All plaintiffs were employed in the Secretary of State's office under Democrat Paul
Powell. It is not clear whether plaintiffs were registered Democrats or not, but all alleged that
their discharges were "politically motivated." Five of the affiants in the case stated that they
had been requested to change their affiliations to the Republican Party. There was no allega-
tion that any plaintiffs belonged to a subversive organization.
5. Plaintiffs also alleged that they could not be discharged without first being afforded
the procedural due process rights of prompt notice and hearing. The instant court rejected
this aspect of plaintiffs' claim by relying on Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972),
to find that a patronage employee does not have a "legitimate claim of entitlement" that
would give him "property" interests that are protected by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
6. Defendant alleged that the basis for the discharge was the widespread inefficiency
and confusion that he found to exist in the office when he was appointed by Republican
Governor Richard Ogilvie. In addition, defendant raised 3 objections to the court's considera-
tion of the merits: patronage dismissals constitute a nonjusticiable political question; the
federal courts are without power to impose a civil service code on a state; and the long-
standing tradition of patronage dismissals is a matter for legislative, not judicial determina-
tion.
7. Defendant raised 3 separate justifications for the dismissals: since each discharged
employee was a patronage appointee with knowledge that he would be fired if a new party
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granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plead-
ings. On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit, held, reversed and remanded. A state's dismissal of
non-policy-making employees who are not protected by state civil
service laws on grounds of political affiliation constitutes an in-
fringement of the employee's freedom of association under the first
amendment. Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34 v. Lewis,
473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928 (1973).
The practice of allocating public employment positions on the
basis of political patronage8 has existed on the federal, state, and
local levels of government since the inception of the Republic.' In
order to mitigate the harshness of the spoils system and improve
morale and efficiency in the public service, Congress enacted the
first civil service statute in 1883.1" This legislation expressly pro-
vided that federal employees could not be dismissed on political
party grounds and that all future hirings, firings, and promotions
were to be made on a merit basis without regard to political affilia-
tion. Many state and local governments have followed the federal
model," and today, for purposes of analyzing various rights, public
were elected, plaintiffs should be regarded as waiving any right to object to their dismissal;
political affiliation may be a relevant and proper qualification for certain positions; and
effective administration of departments of government requires public executives to have
broad latitude in appointing, replacing, and discharging personnel.
8. The scope of the practice in recent years is indicated by several specific instances of
large-scale firings of public employees after an incumbent party loses and a new party takes
over. During the early 1960's Pennsylvania Republicans under Governor William Scranton
"laid off" some 7,800 Democrats in the Department of Transportation and replaced them
with Republicans. In the instant case some 4,000 workers were fired by Secretary of State
Lewis in Illinois. The 1970 Pennsylvania election of Democrat Milton Shapp was followed by
the dismissal of some 3,500 Republicans in a "highway department reorganization." Taking
Politics Out of the Paycheck, Bus. WEEK, May 22, 1971, at 22.
9. In 1829 during the administration of President Andrew Jackson, this practice, com-
monly known as the "spoils system," was championed by the elected representatives who had
the spoils (jobs) to distribute and loathed by the "outs" who lost their jobs and their power.
Aside from mere partisan criticism, mid-nineteenth century reformers stressed the undue
hardships to public employees that resulted from hiring, firing, and promoting based on party
affiliation without due consideration to the employees' competence and effectiveness. See
generally P. VAN RIPER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVIcE 30-59 (1958). As a result,
morale in government service was low and job security was nonexistent. See generally A.
HOOGENBOOM, OUTIAWING THE SPoILS 8 (1961).
10. Civil Service Act, 22 Stat. 403, 404 (Jan. 16, 1883), as amended 5 U.S.C. § 7321
(1970), provided "that no person in the public service is for that reason under any obligations
to contribute to any political fund, or render any political service, and that he will not be
removed or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so." See generally P. VAN RIPER, supra note
9, at 96-112.
11. In 1958, 39 states, all cities of more than 500,000, all but one city between 250,000
and 500,000, most cities between 100,000 and 250,000, and many smaller cities were under
civil service laws. H. KAPLAN, THE LAw OF CIvIL SERvica 22-29 (1958).
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employees are divisible into two distinct categories:' 2 middle level
bureaucrats who are covered by civil service legislation;' 3 and lower
level, non-policy-making employees who are not protected by stat-
ute. Unlike those employees within the purview of civil service legis-
lation, the non-policy-making employees generally have been sub-
ject to dismissal on party affiliation grounds.'4 Analogizing non-civil
service public employment to private employment,'5 most pre-1952
courts concluded that public employees were not protected constitu-
tionally from arbitrary dismissals in situations in which the govern-
ment acts in a proprietary role as employer." Before 1952, the due
process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments constituted
a principal avenue of constitutional attack against employee dis-
missals. Rejecting a due process claim in the case of Bailey v.
Richardson,17 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals focused on
the question whether there was a right to public employment'" that
12. Cf. 3 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 12.27 (3d ed. 1963). A third cate-
gory-high level policy makers with broad discretionary powers-can be included. This group
generally is appointed by the chief elected official-mayor, Governor, or President-at the
local, state, or federal level and may be dismissed at will by the appointing official. The
unhampered right to dismiss employees at this level is justified by the elected executive's
need for loyalty, responsibility, responsiveness, and accountability to carry out his program
and policies. See Note, A Constitutional Analysis of the Spoils System-The Judiciary Visits
Patronage Place, 57 IowA L. Ray. 1320, 1321 n.12 (1972).
13. The rights of public employees covered by civil service statutes are largely deter-
mined by local, state, or federal legislation. Generally, civil servants cannot be dismissed on
grounds of political affiliation. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7321 (1970).
14. Judge Prettyman stated this view in the case of Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46
(D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951): "But the
plain hard fact is that so far as the Constitution is concerned there is no prohibition against
the dismissal of Government employees because of their political beliefs, activities or affilia-
tions." 182 F.2d at 59. See generally Note, Constitutional Limitations on Political Discrimi-
nation in Public Employment, 60 HARv. L. Rav. 779 (1947).
15. For a critical examination of this analogy see Van Alstyne, The Constitutional
Rights of Public Employees: A Comment on the Inappropriate Uses of an Old Analogy, 16
U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 751, 752-53 (1969). -
16. See Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915), criticized in Powell, The Right to Work
for the State, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 99 (1916); Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 112, 289 S.W.
363, 365 (1927) ("In dealing with its own employees engaged upon its own work, the state is
not hampered by the limitations of. . . the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States."); Note, Constitutional Limitations on Political Discrimination in Public
Employment, 60 HARv. L. REv. 779, 781 (1947).
17. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 341 U.S.
918 (1951).
18. Perhaps the most famous and often-quoted statement on this issue is by Justice
Holmes, speaking for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in McAuliffe v. Mayor of
New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). He dismissed the petition of a policeman
who had been fired for violating a regulation that restricted his political activities. "The
petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
1092 [Vol. 26
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is protected under the "property" or "liberty" clauses of the amend-
ments. The court concluded that because public employment could
not be construed to involve a right to property or liberty, due process
protections did not encompass public employees; 9 instead, public
employment was regarded as a privilege bestowed by the state and
subject to recall at the unfettered discretion of the state.2 Then, in
the 1952 case of Wieman v. Updegraff,21 the Supreme Court shifted
the focus to first amendment rights of the individual public employ-
ees. Departing from the Bailey view,2 2 the Court declared that con-
stitutional protection does not depend on whether a "right" to pub-
lic employment exists, 23 and, more importantly, the Court empha-
sized that constitutional protections do extend to public employ-
ees. 21 When Wieman was decided, freedom of association was re-
garded only as an implied first amendment right indispensable to
the exercise of the express first amendment rights of speech and
assembly.25 In 1958, the Supreme Court in NAACP v. Alabama
2
1
finally recognized freedom of association as a first amendment right
to be a policeman. . . .There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not
agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech, as well as of idleness, by the implied
terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain as he takes the employment on the terms
which are offered him." 155 Mass. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517-18. See generally Bruff,
Unconstitutional Conditions Upon Public Employment: New Departures in the Protection
of First Amendment Rights, 21 HASTWGS L.J. 129, 164-66 (1969); Chaturvedi, Legal Protec-
tion Available to Federal Employees Against Wrongful Dismissal, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 287, 316-
22 (1968); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law,
81 H ,v. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
19. "It has been held repeatedly and consistently that Government employ is not 'prop-
erty'.... We are unable to perceive how it could be held to be 'liberty.' Certainly it is not
'life'. ... [T]he due process clause does not apply to the holding of a Government office."
182 F.2d at 57.
20. See id. at 58.
21. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
22. The right-privilege distinction espoused in Bailey has been rejected by the Supreme
Court in a line of opinions dating from 1952. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
481 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262
(1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183 (1952). Mr. Justice Blackmun speaking for the Court in 1971 stated unequivocally:
"[Tihis Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a
governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege.'" Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 364, 374 (1971).
23. "We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employment
exists." 344 U.S. at 192.
24. "It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public
servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory." Id.
25. See Fellman, Constitutional Rights of Association, 1961 Sup. CT. Rv. 74, 76-84.
26. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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of independent status. The scope of the protection accorded individ-
uals and groups by this right is unclear.27 In analyzing the scope of
this protection, however, the Court has adopted a balancing of inter-
ests test, weighing the individual's interest in freedom of association
against the state's interests in restricting its exercise. 28 Moreover,
because the individual's right to associate is regarded as a "funda-
mental" 29 interest, the courts must strictly scrutinize" the state's
interests in imposing its restrictions.3 The Supreme Court's appli-
cation of this balancing process has occurred almost exclusively in
cases of dismissals of public employees with alleged Communist
associations. These cases have been evaluated in light of the state's
legitimate interest in protecting itself from subversion. 32 In 1967, the
Supreme Court in Keyishian v. Board of Regents33 enunciated a
rationale that had been developing since Wieman in 1952: public
employees cannot be dismissed on grounds of association with the
Communist Party unless there is a demonstration of an employee's
"specific intent" to pursue actively the unlawful activities of the
organization. 4 The Supreme Court has not yet considered this prin-
27. For a comprehensive discussion of the relationship of the right of association to
other first amendment rights see T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 563-92
(1970). For a discussion of the scope of the right of freedom of association see Emerson,
Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964).
28. 357 U.S. at 466.
29. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
30. "[Sltate action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is
subject to the closest scrutiny." NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
31. In effect, the states must show that the restriction on an individual's right to
associate is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that no less burdensome
alternative is available. "In a series of decisions this Court has held that, even though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960).
32. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602 (1967) ("There can be no doubt
of the legitimacy of New York's interest in protecting its education system from subversion.")
33. Id.
34. Although the Court ostensibly was balancing interests, its attention seems to have
been focused on the relationship between an individual employee, an association, and unlaw-
ful activities of the association. These relationships can be categorized depending upon
knowledge of unlawful activity: "innocent" association, "knowing" association, and associa-
tion with "specific intent." If the relationship of the individual to the group can be character-
ized as merely innocent association because the group engages in no unlawful activities or
because the individual does not know of any unlawful group activities, then the individual's
right to associate is constitutionally protected from governmental interference even if the
organization or certain members in fact conduct unlawful activities, and even when weighed
against substantial governmental interests. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190 (1952)
("[Mlembership may be innocent. A state servant may have joined a proscribed organiza-
tion unaware of its activities and purposes."). If the relationship of the individual to the group
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ciple's application to patronage dismissals resulting from an em-
ployee's affiliation with a non-Communist political party. In recent
decisions, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals35 and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 36 did not apply a constitutional
analysis to patronage dismissals. Both courts reverted to the pre-
1952 Bailey approach and held that public employees have no con-
stitutional protections against dismissals.
The instant court initially rejected defendant's claim that
plaintiffs had no constitutional right to public employment"7 by
finding that plaintiffs were not asserting such a right, but rather
were basing their claim solely on the first amendment. Interpreting
the first amendment freedom of association to encompass member-
ship in a particular political party as well as affiliation with Com-
munist organizations, the court focused on prior-decisions regarding
freedom of association. Pursuant to this examination, the court dis-
tinguished between those cases in which the state had exacted com-
plete surrender of an employee's first amendment rights as a condi-
tion of employment and other cases in which the state merely had
can be characterized as knowing association on the basis of the individual's knowledge of the
group's unlawful activities absent his participation or specific intent to participate, then the
individual's right to associate generally is constitutionally protected from governmental inter-
ference even in the face of substantial state interest. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 606 (1967) ("Mere knowing membership without a specific intent to further the unlawful
aims of an organization is not a constitutionally adequate basis for exclusion from [public
teaching positions]."). Finally, if the relationship of the individual to the group can be
characterized as association with specific intent on the basis of the individual's knowledge of
the group's unlawful activity and of his participation or specific intent to participate, then
the individual's associational rights are not protected from governmental interference because
of the overriding state interest in preventing and punishing unlawful conduct. Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961). In
summary, the Keyishian Court seems to have adopted a position that constitutional protec-
tion encompasses "innocent" and "knowing" associations, but no constitutional protection
is accorded association with "specific intent" to engage in unlawful activities.
35. Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972).
36. American Fed'n of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527,
280 A.2d 375 (1971).
37. The court rejected the jurisdictional objections raised by defendant. See note 6
supra. Finding that the issue is not one to be decided by a coequal political branch of
government and that judicially manageable standards were available for resolving the dis-
pute, the court decided that patronage dismissals do not present a nonjusticiable political
question. The court rejected defendant's assertion that recognition of plaintiffs' constitutional
claim would be tantamount to foisting a civil service code upon the State by distinguishing
the grant of tenure to an employee from the prohibition of a discharge for a particular
impermissible reason. Finally, the court rejected defendant's contention that patronage dis-
missals were a matter for legislative, not judicial determination. The court's concern was
alleged infringement by the State of the first amendment rights of a public employee, and
this was an appropriate matter for judicial review.
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inhibited the free exercise of these rights by its employees. This
distinction produced a finding that, although a total surrender of
rights has never been tolerated, curtailment has been permitted on
proof of a commanding state interest." Moreover, the court deter-
mined that the discharge of non-policy-making employees along
party lines tended to stifle the employees' freedom to choose among
competing political philosophies-a chilling effect that is impermis-
sible unless the state can meet the heavy burden of proof that a
discharge was necessary for the furtherance of a significant state
interest. In light of this reasoning and assuming for purposes of the
appeal that plaintiffs' dismissals were politically motivated, 39 the
court held that defendant's motion for summary judgment was
granted improvidently by the district court and therefore remanded
the case for trial.4" In a concurring opinion, Judge Campbell warned
against converting the federal courts into "super civil service com-
missions" for all state and local employees not covered by civil
service legislation. Moreover, he expressed doubt as to whether the
courts were as well qualified as the legislatures to define what con-
stitutes a "non-policy-making" position. Judge Campbell also ques-
tioned the practical effects of the majority decision in view of the
probable difficulty the dismissed employee will have in proving that
party affiliation was the actual basis for his dismissal.
41
38. The court seems to derive the distinction between "curtailment" and "surrender"
from Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (dealing with freedom of speech, not
association), as construed by the Seventh Circuit in Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th
Cir. 1972). For the notion of "curtailment" the court relies upon United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), which upheld the Hatch Act's restriction on the political activi-
ties of public employees.
To help define the meaning of "surrender," the court offers these examples: "no state
interest could justify a requirement that an employee falsely swear allegiance to an offensive
religious or political faith, or a requirement that he actively work for, or speak out in favor
of, a political cause deemed obnoxious." 473 F.2d at 572.
If the conditions merely involve some "curtailment," the court declared, then the inter-
ests of the State must be strong enough to justify the condition.
39. The court based its analysis of the law on two other assumptions: the employees
were doing competent jobs, and they did not hold jobs with policy-making responsibilities.
40. In commenting upon the justifications raised by the State that might be subject to
further consideration on remand, the court recognized the State's interest in providing its
executives with broad discretion in the performance of their managerial functions in order to
promote efficient and effective government; but the court suggested that political dismissals,
especially on a large scale, hinder efficiency rather than promote it. The court agreed with
the State that political affiliation might be a relevant qualification at the public executive
level, but suggested that it might not be relevant for non-policy-making employees. To the
State's argument that these employees, as beneficiaries of patronage, should be held to have
waived their rights of objection for dismissal, the court replied that the courts will indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver of constitutional rights.
41. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Kiley espoused the Bailey view that there is no
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The instant decision, by extending constitutional freedom of
association protections to public employees who have been dis-
missed on the basis of political party affiliation, marks the first
judicial acceptance of a constitutional attack on the spoils system.
The court's holding is consistent not only with previous authority
recognizing protection of public employees' constitutional rights
against unreasonable state infringement," but also with the job se-
curity that civil service legislation accords other public employees. 3
In evaluating the court's ruling, the benefits and limitations of the
decision must be considered in conjunction with its potential im-
pact on the political process. Although the instant court was correct
in its rejection of the right-privilege approach and in its adoption
of a more typical first amendment balancing test,44 the decision is
not without its flaws. The court emphasized the distinction between
state-induced surrender as opposed to curtailment of the employee's
rights as determinative of whether the state's infringement abso-
lutely is prohibited or will be permitted under certain limited condi-
tions, but the court failed to provide any definitive guidelines for
making such a distinction. The court did not even explain why it
construed patronage dismissals as curtailment rather than surren-
der. Since a state, by threatening dismissal, may attempt to pro-
hibit an employee from associating with another party for political
purposes such as registration, campaigning, and voting, these at-
tempted prohibitions would seem to be at least arguably tanta-
mount to forcing a surrender of rights. A second definitional prob-
lem is created by the court's restriction of the decision's scope to
non-policy-making employees. Perhaps, as was noted by Judge
Campbell, the difficulties inherent in delineating any workable
standards for making this characterization of public employees are
constitutional prohibition against the dismissal of governmental employees because of their
political beliefs, activities, or affiliations. See notes 17-20 supra. He would have followed the
Second Circuit in Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971).
42. See notes 21-24 & 33-34 supra.
43. See notes 10-11 supra.
44. Although the complaint in the instant case apparently was framed on association
grounds only, political party dismissals should be vulnerable to attacks under the equal
protection clause as well. See Schoen, Politics, Patronage, and the Constitution, 3 IND. L.F.
35, 75-82 (1969). The employees could argue that classification on the basis of party affiliation
for purposes of determining competency is arbitrarily discriminatory and a denial of the
employee's right to equal protection of the laws. Because freedom of association necessarily
involves a fundamental right, courts in confronting this issue would apply a strict standard
of review and would not utilize a balancing approach. Thus, reliance on the equal protection
argument probably would result in greater insurance against erosion of first amendment
rights than would reliance on the first amendment itself.
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such that they should be resolved legislatively. Furthermore, the
strict requirements of proof enunciated in the instant decision may
render the federal courts less effective in protecting individual em-
ployees than the informal, less costly, and more easily accessible
administrative tribunals established under civil service statutes.
Although the decision undoubtedly will lessen pressure on public
employees to devote time and money to political parties, its poten-
tial effect may be obviated appreciably by the difficulty that dis-
charged employees are likely to encounter in proving that party
affiliation actually was the reason for their dismissal. Mass firings
of members of the losing political party will be precluded by the
instant decision, but a state employer who wants to fire a nonparty
employee on an individual basis probably can circumvent the con-
straints of the decision by discreetly compiling complaints and un-
favorable fitness reports against the employee prior to the dis-
charge.15 Nevertheless, the expanded scope of protection accorded
individual liberties by the Supreme Court in recent years may
thwart individual discharges, with the courts looking to the sub-
stance of the dismissal rather than to the form. Turning to the
practical ramifications of the decision on the political process, it is
doubtful that the instant holding will have any significant adverse
effects on the state's ability to ensure effective and efficient govern-
mental service for its citizenry; on the contrary, the removal of party
affiliation as a determinative factor in hirings, firings, and advance-
ments should improve governmental effectiveness as evidenced by
the civil service's record. Moreover, administrative efficiency
should be augmented further by the absence of large-scale employee
turnovers after elections. Of course, from a practical standpoint,
political affiliation can never be removed totally from hiring consid-
erations, but its impact can be lessened significantly. If the holding
of this decision is adopted widely, a traditional source of political
party workers may be depleted. The necessity of patronage to politi-
45. An illustration of how unconstitutional grounds for public employee dismissals may
be circumvented can be found in companion cases decided by 5 to 4 votes: Lerner v. Casey,
357 U.S. 468 (1958), and Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958). Plaintiffs were public
employees who refused on fifth amendment grounds to answer questions concerning their
alleged Communist affiliations. The majority in each case stressed that the dismissals rested
on other than unconstitutional grounds; the basis for the dismissals was regarded as "lack of
candor" in refusing to answer relevant questions during an inquiry into job fitness. The
dissenting justices argued that it is impermissible for the State to dismiss an employee for
exercising his constitutional rights.
46. See generally P. VAN RiPER, supra note 9, at 333-64.
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cal party effectiveness, however, is subject to present doubt. 7 Sev-
eral generations ago when patronage flourished, the promise of gov-
ernment jobs could attract the political allegiance of urban workers,
especially the unemployed and dissatisfied; today, growth in eco-
nomic prosperity and the attendant expansion of educational oppor-
tunity has greatly diminished the benefits of patronage jobs. Moreo-
ver, poor pay and dismal prospects of job security, which are charac-
teristic of most patronage jobs, discourage many potential jobhold-
ers.' Also, special interest groups, particularly labor unions, have
begun to provide alternate sources of political party manpower. Fi-
nally, the government, through its expanded social welfare pro-
grams, has decreased many of the social and charitable benefits to
be gained by patronage employment. The declining importance of
distributing government jobs by the parties has been recognized for
some time, and the political parties appear to be adjusting; there-
fore, it is unlikely that the impact of the instant decision on the
political process will cause any unanticipated results.
Torts-Wrongful Death-Common-Law Cause of
Action for Wrongful Death Exists Under Massa-
chusetts Law
Plaintiff, widow of decedent who was killed when his car col-
lided with a tractor-trailer driven by defendant,' instituted an ac-
tion for wrongful death on behalf of decedent's three minor children 2
when she was appointed administratrix of the estate three years
after his death. The trial court granted defendant's pretrial motion
to dismiss on the ground that the statute of limitations had run.3
47. Sorauf, Patronage & Party, 3 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 115, 118-19 (1959). See also
Sorauf, The Silent Revolution in Patronage, in URBAN GOVERNMENT 376 (Banfield ed. 1969);
Sorauf, State Patronage in a Rural County, 50 AM. POL. ScI. REv. 1046 (1956).
48. Sorauf, Patronage & Party, 3 MIDWEST J. POL. ScI. 115, 120 (1959).
1. Defendant Webb was the driver of the tractor-trailer and allegedly was engaged in
the business of the 2 corporate defendants at the time of the accident.
2. At the same time plaintiff also brought an action for conscious suffering as decedent
Gaudette's personal representative. See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 228, § 1 (1955); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 260, § 4 (1968).
3. The wrongful death statute in effect at the time of Gaudette's death provided that
"[a]n action to recover damages under this section shall be commenced within one year from
the date of death or within such time thereafter as is provided by sections four, four B, nine
or ten of chapter two hundred and sixty." MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (Supp. 1966). Section
4 requires commencement of tort actions arising out of auto accidents "within two years next
after the cause of action accrues." MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 4 (1968).
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Plaintiff asserted on appeal that the statute of limitations had not
run since the general statute of limitations provides for tolling if the
claimant is a minor when the cause of action accrues.4 Defendant
contended, however, that since the action for wrongful death was
purely statutory and the wrongful death statute contained its own
time limits with no tolling provision, the general statute of limita-
tions tolling provisions were not available to plaintiff.5 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, held, reversed. The right to re-
cover for wrongful death is a product of common-law, not statutory
origin, and thus the tolling provisions of the general statute of limi-
tations are available in a wrongful death action. Gaudette v. Webb,
284 N.E.2d 222 (Mass. 1972).
In the 1607 case of Higgins v. Butcher,6 an English court denied
recovery in an action brought by a husband for the wrongful death
of his wife. Although the legal reasoning of this case is unclear,
7
Higgins came to be cited for the proposition that the defendant's
tort liability for a wrongful death merges into and thus is redressed
completely by his liability for the felony that he has committed.8
This felony-merger doctrine was a logical outgrowth of the Crown's
custom of seizing all of a felon's goods, leaving nothing to satisfy a
4. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 260, § 7 (1968). Plaintiff also contended that the time was
extended by MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 10 (1968), which provides, "If a person entitled to
bring . . . any action before mentioned dies before the expiration of the time hereinbefore
limited . . . and the cause of action by law survives, the action may be commenced by the
executor or administrator at any time within the period within which the deceased might have
brought the action or within two years after his giving bond for the discharge of his trust
. ." The instant court summarily held that § 10 applies only to actions that the deceased
might have brought, and since wrongful death actions may only be brought by the executor
or administrator of the deceased, § 10 does not apply.
5. The Massachusetts Supreme Court had held previously that the time limitation in
the wrongful death statute is a limitation on the right as well as the remedy and that the
tolling provisions of the general statute of limitations, therefore, are not applicable in a
wrongful death action. See Bickford v. Furber, 271 Mass. 94, 97-99, 170 N.E. 796, 798 (1930).
6. Yelv. 89, 80 Eng. Rep. 61 (K.B. 1607).
7. Whether the action was brought for a personal tort to the wife and thus would have
died with her, or whether the action was brought by the husband in his own right for loss of
consortium cannot be determined. See Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L.
REv. 1043, 1056 (1965). Compare Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability in Tort, 29 COLUM.
L. REv. 239, 252 (1929), with Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q.
REV. 431. 434-35 (1916).
8. See F. TIFFANY, DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT § 2 (2d ed. 1913); Smedley, Wrongful
Death-Bases of the Common Law Rules, 13 VAN. L. REv. 605, 611-13 (1960); Voss, The
Recovery of Damages For Wrongful Death at Common Law, at Civil Law, and in Louisiana,
6 TUL. L. REv. 201, 203 (1932). In Noy's report of Higgins, however, the court is quoted as
stating that although the action for the wife died with her, an action for the death of a servant
would have survived. See Higgins Case, Noy 18, 74 Eng. Rep. 989 (K.B. 1607).
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tort claim? After Higgins no wrongful death case was reported in
England'" until 1808 when Lord Ellenborough" sitting at nisi prius
declared in Baker v. Bolton'2 that the common law did not recognize
an action for the wrongful death of a person. Although Lord Ellen-
borough cited no authority and gave no reason for his decision,' 3
subsequent courts interpreted the holding of Baker v. Bolton to be
based on either the felony-merger doctrine or the rule that a per-
sonal right of action does not survive its holder." Recognizing that
the nonrecovery rule of Baker was harsh, Parliament enacted Lord
Campbell's Act,'5 which permitted executors to bring actions on
behalf of families of persons killed in accidents.'8 The existence of
this Act and of similar statutes in the United States accounted in
part for the failure of subsequent courts to examine the holding of
Baker." In 1848, the Massachusetts Supreme Court followed
Baker-although expressly rejecting the felony-merger doctrine-in
9. See Holdsworth, supra note 7, at 433.
10. Malone, supra note 7, at 1057 & n.76.
11. Dean Prosser has stated that Lord Ellenborough's "forte was never common sense."
W. PROSSER, TORTS § 127, at 901 (4th ed. 1971). Two courts, however, have commented on
the weight of Lord Ellenborough's name. See Green v. Hudson River R.R., 28 Barb. 9 (N.Y.
1858); Admiralty Comm'rs v. S.S. Amerika, [1917] A.C. 38 (1916).
12. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
13. In a 1675 proposed statute on wrongful death, William Shepherd had stated that
there was no common-law right of action for wrongful death. See W. SHEPHERD, ENGLAND'S
BALM 148 (1657). Lord Ellenborough, therefore, might have thought that the proposition
went without saying.
14. For a criticism of Baker see 3 W. HouSwORm, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 676-77
(3d ed. 1923); Holdsworth, supra note 7, at 431-37; Smedley, supra note 8, at 613-16; Winfield,
supra note 7, at 252-53.
15. The Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93, §§ 1-6 (1846). The preamble of the
Act acknowledged the Baker holding by stating, "Whereas no-Action at Law is now maintain-
able against a Person who by his wrongful Act, Negligence, or Default, may have caused the
Death of another Person."
16. For a discussion of the Act see F. POLLOCK, TORTS 54-57 (15th ed. 1951), and Voss,
supra note 8, at 205-08. Pollock stated that "[i]nstead of abolishing the barbarous rule of
Baker which was the root of the mischief complained of, it created a new and anomalous kind
of right and remedy by way of exception." F. POLLOCK, supra, at 55.
17. See Malone, supra note 7, at 1059, 1069, 1073-76. In England, the first reexamina-
tion of Baker was made in an 1873 action to recover burial expenses that were not compensa-
ble under Lord Campbell's Act. The majority of the court followed Baker, also citing the
preamble to Lord Campbell's Act as authority. See Osborn v. Gillett, L.R. 8 Ex. 88 (1873).
In an often quoted dissent, however, Bramwell pointed out that the right to recover seemed
"broad, plain, and clear" and that the majority should have given more convincing proof than
a mere citation to Baker and the few American cases that followed it. Id. at 93-99. Nine years
later a Canadian court also followed Baker. See Monaghan v. Horn, 7 Can. S. Ct. 409 (1882).
An English court quoted Monaghan 24 years later in upholding Baker. See Clark v. London
Gen. Omnibus Co., [1906] 2 K.B. 648, 652-53. For a discussion of these cases see Holdsworth,
supra note 7, at 431-32, 435.
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the case of Carey v. Berkshire Railroad.'" Similarly, in Insurance Co.
v. Brame" the United States Supreme Court found that there was
no common-law action for wrongful death and stated that the Baker
principle was not even open to question." Nine years later in an
admiralty case, The Harrisburg,21 the Supreme Court applied the
Brame decision to maritime law. 22 The Harrisburg decision, how-
ever, was overruled in 1970 by Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc. ,23 in which the Supreme Court declared that the rule denying a
right of action was a striking departure from elementary principles
of the law of remedies24 and should be retained only if founded on
sound reason. Any factors that might have justified the rule in
England never existed in the United States, according to the Court,
and hence Baker probably was adopted in America solely because
18. 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475 (1848). For a discussion of Carey v. Berkshire R.R. see Hay,
Death As a Civil Cause of Action in Massachusetts, 7 HAv. L. REv. 170 (1893).
Several earlier American decisions had recognized a right of action. See Plummer v.
Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894 (No. 11,234) (D. Me. 1825), dismissed on appeal for lack of admiralty
juris., 19 F. Cas. 891 (No. 11,233) (C.C.D. Me. 1827); Cross v. Guthrey, 2 Root 90, 1 Am. Dec.
61 (Conn. 1794); Ford v. Monroe, 20 Wend. 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838). For a discussion of these
cases see TIFFANY, supra note 8, at 8-9; Malone, supra note 7, at 1066-67.
19. 95 U.S. 754 (1877).
20. The Court stated, "The authorities are so numerous and so uniform to the proposi-
tion, that by the common law no civil action lies for an injury which results in death, that it
is impossible to speak of it as a proposition open to question. It has been decided in many
cases in the English courts and in many of the State courts, and no deliberate, well-considered
decision to the contrary is to be found." Id. at 756-57. Brame was decided when there was
still a general federal common law under Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
21. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
22. In 1959 the Supreme Court followed its Harrisburg decision in The Tungus v.
Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 590 (1959). In 1914 the English House of Lords also reaffirmed the
principle in Baker and applied it to an admiralty case. See Admiralty Comm'rs v. S.S.
Amerika, [1917] A.C. 38 (1916). The House of Lords stated that although the reasons for
denying a cause of action were purely historical, it was unwilling to disturb Baker. For a
discussion of The Amerika see 3 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 14, at 676-77; F. PoLLocK, supra
note 16, at 54. In Rose v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826, 833-34, the House of Lords emasculated
the rule in Baker and criticized the decision in The Amerika. See Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1970).
23. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
24. The Court stated, "Where existing law imposes a primary duty, violations of which
are compensable if they cause injury, nothing in ordinary notions of justice suggests that a
violation should be nonactionable simply because it was serious enough to cause death ...
Because the primary duty already exists, the decision whether to allow recovery for violations
causing death is entirely a remedial matter." Id. at 381-82.
25. Professor Bauer has stated that "the principle has been recognized by American
courts more because of the fact that it is firmly established by precedent than because it is
based upon any sufficient reason." R. BAUER, DAMAGES 414 (1919). See also Holmes v. 0. &
C. Ry., 5 F. 75, 78 (D. Ore. 1880), in which the court stated, "It is also admitted that the
weight of authority in this country is with the English rule. But it is not admitted that the
rule is founded in reason or is consonant with justice."
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of its age. Furthermore, the Court found that the existence of state
and federal wrongful death statutes26 indicated a present public
policy of overwhelming support for allowing recovery. Since these
statutes had now become part of the general law, the Court con-
cluded that a common-law cause of action for wrongful death exists
in admiralty.2 7 The Court, however, did not determine the availabil-
ity of this right of action outside of maritime law.
Recognizing Baker v. Bolton" as the foundation of the nonre-
covery rule, the instant court carefully examined this early decision.
Although Lord Ellenborough had offered no reason for his holding
in Baker, the instant court stated that the case was believed to rest
on two grounds: the felony-merger doctrine and the the rule that a
personal right of action does not survive its holder. The instant court
discredited the felony-merger doctrine as a basis for the Baker deci-
sion since that case involved simple negligence rather than a felony;
the nonsurvival rule was also rejected as a basis since a right to sue
for wrongful death would have vested not in the decedent but in a
third party. Consequently, the court refused to recognize Baker as
declaratory of the common law. The bourt also overruled its own
prior decision in Carey v. Berkshire Railroad,29 a case denying
wrongful death recovery that had relied on Baker and the theory
that damages in a wrongful death action are a mere legislative gra-
tuity. The court pointed out that there is no element of "gratuity"
in the payment of damages by a wrongdoer. Having rejected the
precedent for nonrecovery, the court looked to Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc.,30 which held that there was a right of action in
admiralty, and cited it as an affirmative basis for allowing the ac-
tion. The instant court stated that since the reasoning in Moragne
was primarily in reference to nonmaritime statutory and common
law, its logic should be applicable to Massachusetts law. The court,
therefore, found a common-law right of action for wrongful death to
exist under Massachusetts law but declared that its application is
26. Statutes exist in all 50 states and in the territories of the United States. Three
federal statutes provide for recovery in particular situations, and the Warsaw Convention
provides for recovery when the death results from international travel. See Note, Wrongful
Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REv. 402, 402-03 (1966).
27. For a discussion of Moragne see Comment, The General Maritime Action for
Wrongful Death: Pleading and Practice in the Wake of Moragne, 10 HoUSTON L. REv. 101
(1972); Comment, Wrongful Death on State Waters: A Remedy under General Maritime Law,
44 TEMp. L.Q. 292 (1971); 24 ARK. L. REv. 526 (1971); 49 TEXAS L. REv. 128 (1970).
28. 1 Camp. 493, 17 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
29. 55 Mass. (1 Cush.) 475 (1848).
30. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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subject to all restrictions already placed on the statutory right. The
court stated, however, that because the right was of common-law
origin, its time limitations would now be subject to the tolling provi-
sions of the general statute of limitations.
The court in the instant case is the first to extend the principle
of Moragne beyond maritime law and to find a general common-law
cause of action for wrongful death. This holding, however, was pre-
cipitated not by a scholarly analysis of the history of wrongful death
actions,31 but by the equities of a hard case. The court was faced
with the prospect of barring three innocent, minor children from
recovery if it followed its earlier decisions that had refused to apply
general tolling provisions to the wrongful death statute. Therefore,
in order to provide relief for the children, the court felt compelled
to overrule 164 years of common-law tradition by finding a right of
action independent of the statute. In light of its limited objective,
however, the court subjected the newly created right to all of the
constraints that had bound the statutory right except the time limit
that would have barred recovery in the instant case. Looking beyond
the court's immediate desire to do equity, it is important to deter-
mine whether this decision, considered in conjunction with
Moragne,32 will create enough secondary authority for other state
supreme courts to declare a common-law right of recovery. Most
wrongful death statutes contain many limitations on recovery and
are in great need of revision; and since the equities in a wrongful
death action normally weigh on the side of granting relief,33 other
courts ate certain to be faced with situations similar to the instant
one. Plaintiffs may seek to circumvent other constraints on the sta-
tutory right such as the prescribed group of beneficiaries or the
statutory ceiling on the amount of recovery.34 If they succeed, the
31. For a disscussion of the propriety of the court's overturning 164 years of precedent
see B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JuDicIAL PRocEss 66, 152 (1921). For a discussion of the
propriety of the court's basing its decision on the existence of statutes see Landis, Statutes
and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213-14, 226-27 (1934); Pound, Common
Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. Rxv. 383, 406-07 (1908); Pound, Comments on Recent
Important Admiralty Cases, 13 NACCA L.J. 162, 189 (1954); Stone, The Common Law in
the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 13-14 (1936).
32. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
33. A clear example of the equities of a case conflicting with the limits on a statutory
right to recover can be seen in Hance v. Haun, 216 Tenn. 176, 391 S.W.2d 621 (1965). In
Hance, a child brought a wrongful death action against his stepfather who had killed the
mother. The Tennessee Supreme Court held that the child had no right of action under
Tennessee's survival type statute because intrafamily immunity would have barred the
mother from bringing any action if she had lived.
34. Other possible reasons for evading the statute are: to avoid a statute of limitations;
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locus of activity will shift to the state legislatures, which probably
will take action in reply to judicial revision of statutory law. If
legislative reexamination of wrongful death statutes does occur, the
courts will have accomplished at least part of their goal-achieving
a long-needed revision of the right to recover for wrongful death.
to have damages computed by a different means; to avoid the infirmities of a survival statute;
to recover from the wrongdoer's estate if he has died; to recover hospital and funeral expenses
that are not compensable under the statute; or to avoid contributory negligence as a bar. See
Note, 44 N.C.L. Rav., supra note 26.

